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SHOULD TRADE SECRET APPROPRIATION BE CRIMINALIZED?

Introduction
The emerging scheme of protection for trade secrets reflects
characteristics from both property and liability-based systems of
regulation. Trade secret law has historically been the most diverse of
the intellectual property systems in the United States. Moreover,
unlike other intellectual property protections, trade secrets are
primarily protected by state law. The lack of a consistent standard for
protection has caused considerable confusion as to the applicability of
trade secret law in varying contexts. 1 The proper analysis requires a
recognition that trade secret law does not find its foundations in either
property or liability models, but rather derives certain elements of
each of these systems of regulation.
Trade secrets resemble traditional property rights to the extent
that the state grants entitlements to commercially valuable
information which is kept secret. The intangible, non-scarce nature of
information, however, undermines total application of property-based
concepts. The taking and using of information is better limited by
creating new relationships where they did not previously exist. Under
this analysis, a liability or default liability regime is a more
appropriate means of protecting trade secrets.
Through trade secrecy laws, the government creates incentives to
support and encourage development of commercially useful
information. In return, individual actors develop new technologies
and, by maintaining the secrecy of the information, gain competitive
advantages in the marketplace. However, by enforcing this secrecy,
the trade secret paradigm imposes societal costs for an indefinite
period of time. The costs imposed are justified on the basis that the
social utility gained by increased competitiveness and introduction of
new products is greater than the social costs resulting from limiting or
preventing disclosure.
This balance between private and public interests is extremely
tenuous. The balance must always enhance competition through
protection of intellectual property rights while minimizing the cost to
society. Ultimately, if competition in the marketplace is harmed, the
balance becomes increasingly unstable. Accordingly, those legal
processes which have substantially anticompetitive effects are
undesirable if a less anticompetitive alternative is available. To
determine the proper paradigm for trade secrets, it is necessary to
1. See Christopher R. Pace, The Casefor a FederalTrade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 427 (1995).
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examine the theory underlying trade secret protection.
The federal government has traditionally attempted to protect
trade secrets through criminal law using the National Stolen Property
Act,2 wire fraud and mail fraud statutes,3 and Racketeering in Corrupt
Organization statutes. 4 Furthermore, the federal government has
recently passed a criminal law specifically protecting commercial and
governmental trade secrets. 5 A number of states have also
criminalized trade secret appropriation to deter "blameworthy"
conduct which interferes with trade secret entitlements.6 States also
seek to protect the integrity of information using computer crime
statutes.
The application of criminal law to unauthorized use of trade
secrets imposes transaction costs which are less than optimal. For
example, criminal trade secret prosecution can be abused for
anticompetitive purposes to the benefit of an alleged victim.8 This
result is a counterproductive intrusion into the trade secret paradigm,
the very purpose of which is to promote competition.9 A more
efficient way to punish and deter socially blameworthy conduct is
through punitive damages in civil trade secret actions.
I
The Structure of Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret law serves as a system of regulation to encourage
research, innovation, and development of new ideas of a useful
nature.10 Trade secrets are a key part of industrial power, representing
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Supp. IV 1992).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (Supp. 1992).
4. The RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1996).
5. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996); see infra
Part III.A.l.e.
6. This article will use the terms "misappropriation" and "trade secret theft"
interchangeably. However, this article will discuss misappropriation primarily as a concept
derived from traditional tort law, and trade secret theft as a concept derived from property
law. In either case, the author is referring to the unauthorized use of information that is
protected by trade secret law.
7. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th 580 (1996); Forro Precision v. IBM, 673
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982).
9. See Peter Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secret Thefts Under Federal Law, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 59 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Stephen Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual PropertyIs Property?
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 717 (1993); Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484
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assets which are a requirement for competitiveness in any given
market." Trade secret law conveys an entitlement to information if
the information's value is based on its being kept secret from
competitors. To protect the information, the government creates laws
that encourage parties to maintain standards of commercial ethics by
prohibiting use of improper methods to obtain and use information.
A. The Entitlement to Protection
1. What Should Be Protectedas a Trade Secret?

Numerous definitions exist for trade secrets, but the most
common definitions are found in the first Restatement of Torts, the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act [UTSA] and Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition. A related definition is also found in Article 39 of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [TRIPS].
The First Restatement of Torts provides one of the earliest
definitions of a "trade secret. 1 2 Comment b to section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts reads, "[a] trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."' 13 The
comment adds that a "substantial element of secrecy" is required to
14
state a cognizable claim.
5
The UTSA provided an alternate definition for trade secrets1
The UTSA definition is the most widely accepted definition under
state law.' 6 The UTSA defines trade secrets as:
(1974); John Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO. ST. L.J. 4, 31 (1962); RICHARD POSNER,
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 41 (4th ed. 1992); Mary Lyndon, Secrecy and
Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993).
11. See, e.g., M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.01 (1996).

12. Trade secret misappropriation was dropped from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
13. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
14. Id.
15. Two versions of the UTSA exist. The first UTSA was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners in 1979, and an amended version was approved in 1985. See
14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). For purposes of this article, the substantive provisions are the same.
16. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (Michie
1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to -407 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 607 (Michie 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-.11 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
7-74-101 to -110 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -510 (1990); FLA. STAT.
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information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device method, technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

The UTSA expanded the Restatement definition of trade secrets
considerably to include programs, methods, techniques, and processes.
Additionally, the UTSA permits "potential" value in addition to those
secrets already in use and possessing "actual" value. These expansions
incorporate and recognize the need for expanded flexibility. The
UTSA also changes the definition to read that the secret had
"independent economic value" because others wishing to derive the
same economic value were unaware of the secret. Finally, the UTSA
imposes a requirement that the owner of the information make efforts
to maintain the information in secrecy, thereby incorporating
comment b of the First Restatement of Torts.
The First Restatement of Torts and the UTSA are similar in that
they both assume that two or more competitors could possess the
same information. However, one competitor would not necessarily
know that the other possessed the commercially valuable information.
Under both the first Restatement of Torts and the UTSA, as long as
the information was not generally known, it was granted trade secret
ANN. §§ 688.01-.09 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (1996); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 765, 1065/1 to /9 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §8 550.1-.8 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 88 60-3320 to -3330 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880-.900 (Michie 1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN.

§§

51:1431-:1439 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

10, §§ 1541-1548 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN [CoM. LAW II] §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (1990);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 42 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (West
1981 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
87-501 to -507 (1988 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. 88 600A.010-.100 (1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1-:9 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Michie 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. 88 1333.51-1333.69 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94
(1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.510 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (1992);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 88 37-29-1 to 11 (Michie 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. 88 13-24-1 to -9 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §9 59.1-336
to -343 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 88 19.108.010-.940 (West 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 47-22-1 to-10 (1996); WIS. STAT. § 134.90 (1996). For a discussion of California's
slight variation from the UTSA definition, see James Pooley; The Uniform Trade Secrets
Act: California Civil Code Section 3426, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
193 (1985).
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protection.
Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford actual or potential economic advantage
17
over others."
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also expands
prior definitions to include "any information." 18 The Third
Restatement also clarifies the UTSA and requires that the secrecy of
the information is what affords the economic advantage over
competitors. Unlike the First Restatement of Torts and the UTSA,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition requires reasonable
efforts to maintain secrecy when determining whether information is a
trade secret. 19
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is generally
consistent with the UTSA in requiring that the trade secret be of value
to provide actual or potential economic advantage over others who do
not possess the information. 20 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition and the UTSA differ, however, in their definition of
"value." The UTSA requires "independent" economic value and the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition requires a seemingly
more minimal definition of value as a function of actual or potential
economic "advantage."21
Finally, trade secret protection has been expanded internationally
through Article 39 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. 22 Although TRIPS does not specifically
use the term "trade secret," the United States and other signatory
countries agreed to provide legal protection for undisclosed
information when disclosed or used contrary to "honest commercial
practices." 23 Article 39, paragraph 2, of TRIPS provides:
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to,
17.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).

18.

Id.

19.
20.

Id. § 39 cmt. g.
For examples of the value requirement, see id § 39 cmt. e.

21. Id.
22. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994,33 I.L.M. 1197 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) in General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (as amended)[hereinafter TRIPS].
23. TRIPS, Art. 39, para. 2.
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acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in precise
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known or
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that
normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
by
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, 24"
the person lawfully in control of the information to be kept secret.
The definition under TRIPS incorporates both the appropriation
issues underlying trade secret law and the definition of trade secrets.
TRIPS adds a number of factors that are useful in the analysis of trade
secrets. First, Article 39 requires "control" of "information." 25 Similar
to the Restatement (Third), Article 39 is not limited to certain
categories of information. Rather, Article 39 limits types of
information by requiring "control" by the owner, 26 "secrecy,"
commercial value resulting from the secrecy, and efforts to maintain
secrecy. Similar to the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, under Article 39 the value of the information is directly
related to the fact that the information is secret. Article 39 also adopts
the UTSA requirement that reasonable steps be utilized to maintain
secrecy of the information and the requirement that information "not
[be] generally known." Similar to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition and UTSA, TRIPS implicitly recognizes that numerous
competitors may be aware of information, so long as the knowledge is
not "generally known." However, TRIPS abandoned the notion of
actual or potential "advantage" as articulated in the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.
2. Key Characteristicsof the Entitlement
a. Secrecy

"Secrecy" is, of course, a core characteristic of trade secret law
under all of the definitions. Some commentators have noted that
secrecy is the key formal characteristic of trade secret law. 27 Absolute
secrecy is not necessary.28 Rather, a trade secret claimant need only
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. "Control" is an undefined term under TRIPS. Arguably, the term "control" is
synonymous with "owner" or "licensee" under traditional trade secret laws.
27. Lyndon, supra note 10, at 5.
28. Id.; M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW 5-33 (1987); see also Electro-Craft Corp. v.
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show that information is not generally known. 29
The secrecy element protects trade secret owners from "free
riders." Free riders utilize technology and other commercially
valuable information for their own economic benefit without investing
the time, money or effort required for independent creation.3 0 Free
riders create disincentives to investment in new resources by freely
utilizing information which another has expended considerable
resources to create. Free riders make such investment unattractive
because, without proper protection, a creator has little or no chance of
receiving a return on his investment in creating and exploiting a trade
secret. By granting protection to those people who try to keep
commercially valuable information secret, trade secret law effectively
protects against free riders.
Similarly, secrecy prevents the "tragedy of the commons."3 1 Free
public access creates total depletion of the intellectual asset without a
concomitant social benefit. Eventually, the value of the asset is fully
depleted, and no individual has an interest in filling the intellectual
reserves. Numerous parties' access to and utilization of commercially
valuable information without any commensurate payment ultimately
devalues the resource without reimbursing the creator of the
information. As individuals access and use information, its value
continually decreases. Consequently, creators of socially valuable
information will be less likely to invest the energy, time, and money in
a given field.32 Through secrecy, creators can exploit information and
obtain its financial rewards by limiting public access.
Finally, secrecy creates "lead time" to permit sustained
investment in the development of information.3 3 The social benefit of
such a system derives primarily from the incentive to invest by
allowing exploitation through maintenance of secrecy.3 4 Unlike
copyright and patent law, trade secret law does not impose a fixed
Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898-900 (Minn. 1983).
29. Electro-Craft,332 N.W.2d at 898-900.
30. J. Miles Hanisee, An Economic View of Innovation and Property Right Protection
in the Expanded Regulatory State, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 127,148 (1993).

31.

Id.

32. G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir.
1992).
33. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2507 (1994); C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the
MisappropriationDoctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2
HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 57-62 (1987).
34. Reichman, supranote 33, at 2509.
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term of protection.3 5 Rather, the ability to develop independently or
reverse-engineer is the controlling factor. 36 In contrast to the firm
temporal entitlement afforded by copyright and patent systems, trade
secrecy is flexible
and limited only by the competitive infrastructure of
37
the market.
The system whereby lead time advantage is preserved for
originators also highlights one of the costs associated with trade secret
law. Newcomers cannot simply take existing information and build
from it. Rather, they must independently expend resources to develop
the same information as the originator. To the extent that effort is
duplicated because information is not disclosed, society bears a cost in
an unproductive expenditure of resources to attain information
already available at a lower cost. 38 Accordingly, society suffers a loss
through a waste of resources to create that which has already been
created.
b. "Value"

The second important characteristic of trade secret law is the
notion of "value." Without value, the secretive nature of the
information is irrelevant. Indeed, the only reason to grant an
entitlement is to protect those things, tangible or intangible, which are
of value to the owner of the information.
The value element can be inferred from efforts to keep
information secret from competitors. A market participant is expected
to expend resources to avoid detection of certain pieces of
information. This rule presumes that an actor has no financial or
competitive interest in expending resources to protect disclosure of
information which is not valuable. Furthermore, the "owner" of a
trade secret may exploit the information to gain advantage over other
competitors who do not have the same information. As such, the
competitive and commercial role of information is pivotal in
determining value.

35.
36.
(1982).
37.
38.

Id. at 2510.
Steven Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 41, 49
Lyndon, supra note 10, at 3.
Reichman, supra note 33, at 2532.
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B.

Protecting the Entitlement

1.

The Not-So-Rapidly Developing Definition of "Misappropriation"

The definition of unauthorized use of trade secrets has been
refined to increasingly focus on the relationships between parties. In
situations where relationships do not exist, the systems of protection
attempt to imply or create a relationship.
"Misappropriation" occurs in two distinct situations under the
UTSA, the Restatement (First) of Torts and the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition. First, a trade secret is misappropriated when it
is acquired by a person who knows or has reason to know that the
trade secret was acquired by improper means. 39 "Improper means"
include theft, misrepresentation, breach of a duty to maintain secrecy,
or espionage through electronic or other means.4" Secondly,
misappropriation occurs when a trade secret is disclosed or used
beyond the limits of the authority granted by the owner to the
41
"disclosee."
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition specifically
addresses unauthorized use when parties are placed in positions of
confidence. Section 41 provides that a duty of confidence is owed to
the trade secret owner when:
(a) the person made an express promise of confidentiality prior to
the disclosure of the trade secret; or
(b) the trade secret was disclosed to the person under circumstances
in which the relationship between the parties to the disclosure or
other facts surrounding the disclosure justify the conclusions that, at
the time of the disclosure,
(1) the person knew or had reason to know that the disclosure was
intended to be in confidence, and
(2) the other party to the disclosure was reasonable in inferring
that
42
the person consented to an obligation of confidentiality.
TRIPS focuses almost exclusively on abuses of confidential
relationships between parties. For example, TRIPS specifically grants
the right to prevent individuals from acting "contrary to honest

39. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(i); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
(1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
40. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
41. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(i); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
(1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (1995).
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commercial practices., 43 Article 39 of TRIPS states that "situations
contrary to honest commercial practices" include breach of contract,
breach of confidence, inducement to breach, acquisition of
undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly
negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the
acquisition."
2.

Characteristicsof the Scheme of Protection

The modern formulations of trade secret protection, as evidenced
in the Third Restatement and TRIPS, increasingly focus on the
relationships between specific parties.4 5 These formulations
demonstrate a concern for individuals who obtain secret information
but are then placed in positions to provide the information to
competitors to the detriment of the creator of the trade secret.46
Although the traditional types of information appropriation continue
to exist, the majority of legal developments have endeavored to define
and limit the behavior of those already in some form of confidential
47
relationship with a potential victim.
The effect of these developments is to change the manner in
which the state protects commercially valuable information. Rather
than protecting against the burglar who breaks into an office and
absconds with commercially valuable information, trade secret law
most often attempts to limit the behavior of individuals who may have
obtained the information through lawful means, but then attempt to
use the information in a way that undermines the private incentives
afforded by the trade secret laws. For example, the duties of
confidence and "honest commercial practices" discussed in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and TRIPS seek to
encourage limitations through contract-based systems. Such
limitations may take the form of provisions in licensing agreements or
lists of designated trade secrets for a former employee going to work

43. TRIPS, Art. 39, para. 2.
44. TRIPS, Art. 39, n. 10.
45.

Id. Art. 39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).

46. See Reichman, supra note 33, at 2521-38; Wendy Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 273
(1992).
47. The most common form of trade secret dispute occurs when an employee leaves
one company for a competing company. See, e.g., Pepsico v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th
Cir. 1995); Baxter Int'l v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1992); see also infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
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for a competitor. In this way, developing trade secret law seeks to
regulate the unauthorized use of information as well as the wrongful
acquisition of information.
II
The Theories Underlying Trade Secrets
Two basic paradigms are used to describe trade secret law:
property rules and liability rules.48 The first paradigm assumes that
trade secrets are a form of property and attempts to impose property
rules upon protection of trade secrets. The second paradigm attempts
to place liability rules on actions that interfere with other's rights. In
practice, courts have treated trade secret laws as both property and
liability rules.
A. Trade Secrets as Property
1. PropertyRule Theory Applied to Trade Secrets

Society rewards the efforts of individuals by conveying property
interests. 49 Property rules guarantee property rights through the threat
of the state's police powers. 50 With the state's protection, individuals
are encouraged to engage in useful efforts to generate income. The
income, then, can be used to purchase more property. In this way, the
structure for
state utilizes its police powers to ensure an incentive
51
individuals to engage in socially beneficial activities.
Consider the following example of property-based principles:
Bugs works in a manufacturing plant and earns a salary. From his
savings, Bugs purchases an Acme computer. Because Bugs has true
and lawful possession of the computer, the property-based principle
requires that Daffy should not be able to take the computer without
Bugs' permission. Daffy may not make the unilateral decision to take
the computer and pay Bugs for the trouble and cost of obtaining the
computer under the applicable property rule.
48. The property/liability structure was originally articulated in Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
49. J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE §§ 27-28 (P.
Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO.
L.J. 287, 296 (1991).
50. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996).
51. Id.
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The inability of Daffy simply to take the computer from Bugs lies
at the core of the notions of ownership and property.5 2 Bugs has
earned a salary from his socially productive endeavors. Society then
provides Bugs with a range of choices of property to purchase and
ensures that others will not take the property without his consent.
Through the threatened exercise of police powers, the state provides
incentives for Bugs to work to acquire the things he desires. Under
this analysis, property is a flexible concept used to describe groups of
rights relating to things as a reward for useful social efforts.53 The
common legal characteristics of property are: (1) the rights of
possession,. use and enjoyment; (2) the right of transfer; and (3) the
right to exclude others.54 The state's threatened use of its police
powers, through civil and criminal means, protects these
characteristics.
The conception of trade secrets as a form of property has
appeal.5 5 Holders of protectible information may use, enjoy, buy, sell,
56
lease, and donate intellectual property rights in that information.
Allowing exploitation and use of trade secrets effectively rewards
individuals for their labors. Thus, information in the form of trade
secrets takes on essential characteristics of property.
However, the property rule may not fit as well as a first glance
may suggest. First, the property rule assumes a tangible creation.
Ordinary tangible property is limited in that it may be used by only
one person at any given time. Intellectual property, on the other hand,
can be used by many at once without being exhausted. For example,
information can be readily shared by many people simultaneously.
The only way to limit the proliferation of information is to bind
individuals or to maintain information in total secrecy. 57 The latter
would unduly limit the use and exploitation of valuable pieces of
information. Furthermore, in order to reap the rewards of whatever
52.

Id. at 716.

53.

Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter

Signal a Changing Direction In Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 370

(1989).
54. Id.
55. Indeed, Roger Milgrim, the author of a leading treatise on trade secret law, has no
hesitation in conclusively characterizing trade secrets as property. See R. MILGRIM,
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1967); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467
U.S. 986 (1984).
56. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 370; see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 39-41 (3d ed. 1986).
57. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 369.
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information is encompassed in a trade secret, some secrecy must
invariably be sacrificed. Because of the lack of complete secrecy and
the intangible nature of information, the property rule regime fails to
adequately protect trade secrets. A third party may circumvent the
rule without the owner's consent by lawfully obtaining and then
misusing the information because, once gained, the knowledge cannot
be returned.58
Similarly, the intangible nature of trade secrets is fundamentally
different from tangible property in the manner of exploitation.
Physical property can generally be used at any one time by only one
person or one coordinated group of people. The use by one person of
a physical object necessarily precludes use by another person. The
scarcity of any particular resource is what gives the item its value.
Ideas and information, on the other hand, can be used simultaneously
by numerous users. In that respect, intangible information is limitless
and inexhaustible. The trade secret legal paradigm is merely an effort
to construct artificial scarcity through secrecy. Thus, the manner in
which society attempts to place conceptual fences around such a
ubiquitous entitlement will be fundamentally different from tangible
property.
Thus, in the traditional case of theft of a tangible object, the
economic value is a secondary requirement to the actual taking
because of the tangible object's natural scarcity. 59 The important
characteristic is that the thing taken has value to the owner.6" The
market value or social economic significance is considerably less
important. 61 Trade secrets, on the other hand, do not involve the
individual's valuation of the information. Rather, the definitions of a
trade secret specifically require independent social or economic
value.

62

Finally, because of the intangible nature of trade secrets, the
taking of a trade secret does not necessarily resemble the taking of a
computer or other tangible item and does not require the same overt
acts.63 No actual physical taking is necessary for the taking of a trade
58. Reichman, supra note 33.
59. Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial
Information, 38 EMORY L.J 921, 940 (1989).
60. Id. at 941.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text (discussing various definitions of a
trade secret).
63. Raymond Nimmer & Patricia Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New
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secret. Indeed, a person cannot give back knowledge he or she has
attained. Additionally, if a trade secret is appropriated, the originator
of the trade secret still possesses the information. In a sense, the
owner of the trade secret has lost nothing. The economic damage
caused by the taker's disclosure to others is the primary concern,
however. The wrongful taker of information may use the information
to the detriment of the originator of the information. Accordingly,
trade secret law seeks to limit the taker's behavior in such a way as to
ensure the market value of the trade secret.
2.

CourtApplication of Property Theory

The property paradigm has historically been applied to
intellectual property rights.64 In the United States, property interests
in intangibles was first recognized in International News Service v.
Associated Press .65 In INS, the Associated Press was accused of taking

news printed on the East Coast and printing it on the West Coast
before INS had an opportunity to print it. The Court held:
If that which the complainant has acquired fairly at substantial
profit, a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose of
disposing of it to his own profit and to the disadvantage of
complainant cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or
evanescent to be regarded as property. 6
The Supreme Court's holding in INS was significant because it
established a property right in intangible information. INS also
established the tort of misappropriation which would drive intellectual
67
property expansion in the future.

More recently, the Supreme Court has characterized protection
of information as property. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,68 the Court
Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103,104 (1992).

64. See Zotos International, Inc. v. Kennedy, 460 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.D.C.
1978)(stating that property interests in trade secrets have been recognized in English and
American courts for over a century); Glass v. Kottwitz, 297 S.W. 573, 575 (Tex. App.
1927).
65. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS]. The first case to actually address trade
secrets in property terms is Board of Trade v. Christi Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236,
250-53 (1905). However, INS was the first case to analyze information as a form of
property.
66. 248 U.S. at 215.
67. The case is most often viewed as an unfair competition case. See Samuelson, supra
note 53; see also Douglas Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983); EDMUND
KITCH & HARVEY PERELMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 34
(2d ed. 1979).

68. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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decided that research data submitted to a government agency should
be considered "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 9 The Court decided that the disclosure of the
information by government could be considered a "taking" for which
the government should pay. 70 Similarly, in Carpenter v. United
States,71 the Court held that a reporter misappropriated his employer's
property when, based upon information obtained through his
employer, he bought securities for his own financial gain. In both of
these cases, the Supreme Court arguably determined that efforts to
maintain72 information in secrecy created a protectable property
interest.
These cases reflect concern that unauthorized taking of
information or intentional diminution of value of information is
socially undesirable. Through the Court's holdings, the notion of
information as property expanded, even when the owner of the
information may not necessarily have been harmed, as in Carpenter.
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court's explicit recognition of
information as property justified the use of police power to protect
and criminally punish unauthorized use of information.
B.

Trade Secrets as a Liability-Based Regime

1.

Theory of Liability Regimes

Liability rules require a "wrongdoer" to compensate victims for
harms suffered. 73 In that sense, liability rules are utilized primarily as
a restitutionary remedy because they seek to make a victim whole
again. 74 Liability rules also attempt to compensate those victims who
may not have been able to anticipate that they would be victims. 75 A
final assumption under the liability rule is that the injurer is permitted
69. Id. at 1003-04.
70. Id.
71. 404 U.S. 19 (1987). In Carpenter,a reporter for the Wall Street Journal authored
a regular piece discussing various stocks. The reporter provided the information to a
number of individuals prior to publication. The reporter and one stockbroker were
convicted of wire and mail fraud, as well as violations of the federal securities laws. Id.
72. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 987; Carpenter,484 U.S. 19. Carpenter could also stand for
the proposition that the "property" interest was the integrity and reputation of the Wall
Street Journal, not the information itself. Id.
73. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 50, at 756.
74. Id.
75. John Krier & Stewart Schwab, Property and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 467 (1995).
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to cause harm but then must compensate the7 6victim for the harm, or,
at least, the court's best estimate of the harm.
The classic example of a liability-based rule is negligence. Victims
do not normally anticipate that they will be subjected to another's
negligence. For instance: Smedley accidentally drives through a
stoplight. Dudley, thinking that he can cross safely because his light is
green, is hit by Smedley while crossing the street. Dudley and Smedley
could not have anticipated that they would collide on the street in
advance of the accident. The liability rule will compensate Dudley for
his injuries as a result of Smedley's negligence.
At first blush, liability rules do not properly characterize trade
secret law. Individuals who cause harm in trade secret situations are
somewhat predictable. Most often, the taker is in a position of trust
and gains access to confidential business information by abusing that
trust. In this sense, although a victim may not know exactly who is
wrongfully taking information, the victim can generally narrow the
universe of takers to those individuals having access to the
information.
However, adopting a liability-based regime for trade secrets is
more attractive than a first glance suggests. While the unauthorized
taking of information can be predicted by the very fact that the
information is disclosed, the individuals who will abuse the trust
cannot easily be identified. Thus, the trade secret paradigm imposes a
loosely codified set of default liability rules governing relations
between originators and borrowers that apply when parties themselves
have not entered into a contractual agreement.77 Under such a theory,
the second-comer is faced with the choice of investing in reverse
engineering, independent development, or in licensing the
information.78 Under a typical licensing scheme, the contractual
provisions ensure payment of royalties and/or maintenance of secrecy
and limitations on use. Licensing ensures that the second-comers pay

76. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 50, at 723.
77. Reichman, supra note 33, at 2521; see also Todd Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal
Structure and Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 19 (1993); Gordon,
supra note 46.
78. Reichman, supra note 33; John Stedman, in his seminal article on trade secrets
stated the six basic theories upon which trade secret protection is founded: (1) enforcement
of contracts; (2) tortious inducement to breach of contract; (3) breach of confidence or
trust; (4) considerations of quasi-contract or equity, such as unjust enrichment; (5) tortious
invasion of privacy of a specialized nature; and (6) unfair competition. Stedman, supra note
10, at 22-24. All of these theories are restitutionary, liability-based regimes. Id.
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the costs of the original innovation and develop improvements of their
own. 79 On the other hand, those who choose to wrongfully take
information remain liable for the total costs of research and
development or may be enjoined from use entirely. 8° Thus, the
liability rule is attractive because the consent of the owner is not a
prerequisite to the taking of information. Additionally, the remedy is
primarily restitutionary and seeks to make the plaintiff whole.81 In this
way, the taker must merely compensate the owner for the diminution
in value caused by the taker's use.
2.

CourtApplication of Liability-Based Concepts

Liability-based regimes have support in Supreme Court holdings.
The first case to discuss trade secret law in the context of a liability
rule was E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Power Co. v. Masland.82 In the
case, Justice Holmes wrote:
The word 'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary. consequences of the
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of
good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not
the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special
confidence he accepted. The property may be denied but the
confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point for the present
matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant
83
stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them.
Under this analysis, trade secret law is a scheme to protect
commercially valuable information through confidential relationships.
The emphasis on "relationships," rather than property, is based in
concepts of contract and tort. In this way, the trade secret law behaves
more like a liability-based regime.
Only one year after Masland, the Court decided INS, which

79. Reichman, supra note 33, at 2522.
80. Id.
81. Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights In Valuable Information, 9 J.
LEG. STUDIEs 683, 689, 703 (1980).
82. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
83. 244 U.S. at 102. This analysis was limited in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S.
986, 1003 n.9 (1984). The Ruckelshaus Court found that Justice Holmes did not deny the
existence of a property right in Masland. Rather, the Court explained that Justice Holmes
found property rights irrelevant to the case. Id. Despite the analysis in Ruckelshaus,
Holmes' dicta could support the proposition that the unauthorized use of a trade secret,
rather than the creation of a trade secret, is not a characteristic grounded in property. 244
U.S. at 102.
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recognized information as property. 84 Despite the majority opinion,
both Justice Holmes and Brandeis criticized the idea of information as
property. Justice Holmes' dissent suggested that where protection can
be afforded without granting a right to exclude, property rights are
unnecessary. 85 Rather than focus on the property characteristics of
information, Holmes believed
that the proper analysis was to be found
86
in unfair competition law.
Justice Brandeis' dissent more directly challenged the "property"
finding adopted by the majority. First, he was troubled that the
majority did not attempt to draw any boundaries around the "sweat of
the brow" property right. 87 Second, Brandeis
criticized the majority
88
interest.
public
the
considering
for not
Both of the dissents favored liability rules over property rules in
trade secret paradigms. Brandeis' attempt to "draw boundaries" and
Holmes' opinion to characterize the injury as one arising under
"unfair competition" both support a restitutionary-type remedy.
Under Brandeis' and Holmes' theories, trade secret law would permit
taking but would require restitution by the taker for the damage suffered
as a result of the taking.
The most recent Supreme Court case supporting a liability-based
regime is Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corp. 9 Similar to Justice
Holmes' analysis in Masland, Kewanee implicitly recognized that the
most common form of trade secret misappropriation occurs when a
taker is in a position of confidence or under an implied obligation not
to use or disclose information. 90 The Court held that trade secret law
accomplishes its goals by maintaining standards of commercial ethics
while encouraging innovation. 91 Finally, the Court recognized that the

84. INS, 248 U.S. at 215.
85. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 392; see also Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 497 (1974)(Douglas, J., dissenting)("A trade secret, unlike a patent, has no property
dimension.").
86. INS, 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 262 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
90. Id. at 475 (citing Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154,
156 (1887)).
91. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481-482, citing with approval A.O. Smith Corp. v.
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934). In A.O. Smith Corp., the court
held that trade secret law is permissible to prevent a competitor from destroying the value
of a discovery or "advantage the competitor who, by unfair means or as the beneficiary of
a broken faith, obtains the desired knowledge without paying the price in labor, money, or
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holder of a trade secret will only share his or her information with
others if he/she can place the second-comer under 92a binding legal
obligation to pay a fee and/or protect the trade secret.
The Kewanee opinion suggests that trade secret misappropriation
is primarily an economic injury suffered normally through a breach of
confidence. 93 The Kewanee opinion also suggests that the social costs
associated with trade secret protection weigh in favor of licenses and
contractual-type arrangements which impose obligations to maintain
secrecy and to pay royalties. 94 Thus, the Kewanee opinion stands in
95
support of a liability-based regime for trade secret protection.
However, the Kewanee opinion includes some dicta which
arguably stands in opposition to the notion that trade secrets are
property-based regimes. The opinion states that states may engage in
actions to prevent industrial "espionage." 96 The Court added that
"there is the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society when one
firm steals from another. A most fundamental human right, that of
privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is
made profitable...." 97 Use of the word "steal" demonstrates an
implicit view that information is property and that the wrongful taking
is a form of theft or larceny.
Although Kewanee states that states should be able to protect
against invasions of privacy, the Kewanee Court did not clearly
address whether trade secret law is the appropriate means to protect
privacy interests and protect against "industrial espionage."9 s Trade
secret law, in fact, may be the incorrect mechanism. The "social
wrong" is merely the invasion of protected material, regardless of
whether the information is intended to remain secret or not and
regardless of whether the information is commercially valuable. Such
machines ....Id.
92. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 486.
93. Id. at 485-87.
94. Id. at 486.
95. Indeed, even the dissent noted that a suit to redress theft of a trade secret is
grounded in tort damages for breach of a contract. Id. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 487.
97. Id.
98. Indeed the Kewanee opinion states that trade secret law provides a means to
encourage public disclosure in exchange for payment. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 486. But
see Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 487; Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 155
(1989). These Supreme Court cases discuss the right of privacy and the state's ability to
protect such rights. However, the analyses center on the state's ability to regulate
standards of commercial ethics and to create permissible incentive structures. See, e.g.,
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159-68.
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a social wrong requires no determination of the commercial value of
the subject matter, as is required under trade secret law, but instead
requires a mere invasion of privacy. Such forms of "espionage" can be
demarcated from "confidential relationships" and more closely
approximate a "trespass" theory than a "theft" theory.
C. Trade Secrets Principles as a Hybrid

The conflict in Supreme Court opinions demonstrates the
difficulty in characterizing information as either a property-based or
liability-based concept. Perhaps no such distinction is necessary,
however. Rather, information may bear characteristics of both
property and liability. From a property perspective, the government
grants a series of rights in information which allow for exploitation
and use as a reward for engaging in socially beneficial activities. From
a liability perspective, the government creates remedies when
individuals use the information without authorization and undermine
the statutory entitlement conveyed to creators of information. The
government's efforts are merely an attempt to encourage creation of
commercially useful ideas through a system of statutory entitlements
and limitations on use. The variances from traditional property and
liability-based systems arise because of the nature of the taking and
the type of injury suffered through the unauthorized use of the
entitlement. For the government to meet its objectives, compensating
those individuals who have had information used without
authorization is an appropriate restitutionary remedy.
For example, the First Restatement of Torts, the UTSA, and the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition initially establish the
definition of a trade secret. In doing so, these bodies of law create an
entitlement to certain forms of information and create standards to
determine whether, in order to obtain commercial advantage, an
individual desires to protect the information from disclosure. In
creating standards for protection of information, the state essentially
creates a statutory entitlement to an intangible good.
Second, the UTSA, the Restatement of Torts, the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition and Article 39 of TRIPS attempt to
impose a series of default liability rules. The "misappropriation"
concept provides a civil mechanism for restitution and implies a
relationship between parties who failed to bargain. The liability rule
developed by the Restatement and UTSA thus creates an incentive
structure to encourage bargaining by placing default rules where none
existed previously. Under these paradigms, parties who had useful
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information taken would be ensured commercial remuneration for
their investment and development of information. The various bodies
of law allow for recovery when the unauthorized use of information
reduces the value of the information.
III
Criminal Trade Secret Protection
A.

Criminal Protection for Trade Secret Appropriation

1. FederalRemedies

Historically, federal law has not directly punished unauthorized
use of trade secrets.9 9 Although no specific federal statute governs
trade secrets, wire and mail fraud statutes, 100 statutes prohibiting
interstate transportation of stolen property, 10 1 and racketeering in
corrupt organization statutes10 2 have all been used for criminal trade
secret prosecutions. In addition to the traditional methods, the federal
government has recently enacted a federal criminal trade secret
law. 10 3 Finally, remedies for victims are provided through
4
restitutionary measures in the United States Code.10
a. National Stolen Property Act
Under the National Stolen Property Act, 105 the prosecution must
prove (1) transportation in interstate commerce, (2) existence of
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, (3) a value of $5,000
or more, and (4) knowledge that the objects have been stolen,
converted or taken by fraud. 10 6 Under the NSPA, a party may be fined
and sent to prison for up to ten years. 10 7
The leading case applying the NSPA is Dowling v. United
0 8 In
States.1
Dowling, the Supreme Court addressed whether the

99. Kent Walker, Federal CriminalRemedies for the Theft of Intellectual Property, 16
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 681, 686 (1994); Toren, supra note 9, at 59.
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (Supp. 1992)
101. The National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Supp. IV 1992).
102. The RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1996).
103. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 [hereinafter the NSPA].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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NSPA applied to interstate transportation of unauthorized copies of
commercially unreleased performances of a famous entertainer. No
physical property was actually taken. The Supreme Court held that for
the NSPA to apply, the "goods, wares, or merchandise" component of
the NSPA required a physical identity between the items obtained and
transported."°9 The Court further held that copyright, like other forms
of intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined
interests to which the law affords exact protections. 10 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the "property rights" of a copyright holder have
a character distinct from the traditional possessory interests of
tangible goods. 11 ' Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that
such as
copyright law was the exclusive criminal sanction 1 12 in 1cases
13
Dowling and that the NSPA was too attenuated to apply.
A similar analysis could apply to trade secrets. The Supreme
Court indicated that intellectual property laws in general have
characteristics distinct from tangible property and are comprised of a
series of government entitlements in many situations." 4 Under this
analysis, the appropriate remedies are those legislatively defined by
"tangible taking"
Congress and the states. However, resolution of the
115
clear.
than
less
been
has
NSPA
the
of
requirement
For example, in United States v. Brown," 6 the court held that
although a stolen program was located at the defendant's house, the
prosecution could not prove that the software had been physically
removed from the victim's place of business. 1 17 In reviewing the case,

109. Id. at 216.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 217. The Supreme Court even suggested that because of the potential
intangible nature of protection, copyright infringement does not easily equate with theft,
conversion or fraud. Id. at 217-18.
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1995).
113. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 227.
114. See Id. This analysis suggests that intellectual property rights have no value until
the government creates a statutory protection entitling creators of the information to a
limited "monopoly." Through the mechanism of creation of entitlement and limitation on
use, the government controls the delicate balance between public access and private
incentive.
115. Even before Dowling, courts wrestled with the applicability of the NSPA to
intangibles. Compare United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), with
United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966), and United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d
234 (5th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960); United
States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959).
116. 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
117. Id.

1997]

SHOULD TRADE SECRET APPROPRIATION BE CRIMINALIZED?

877

the Tenth Circuit held that for the NSPA to apply, a tangible item
must be taken, "however insignificant or valueless it may be, absent
the intangible component. ' 118 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held
that the NSPA required involvement of physical "goods, wares, [or]
' 119
merchandise."
An Illinois District Court reached a different result in United
States v. Riggs.120 In Riggs, two individuals acquired a file stored on a
victim's computer system. The file contained the victim's procedures
for installation, operation, and maintenance of emergency 911
services. The defendant dialed into the victim's computer system
without authorization and downloaded the file. Riggs used other
people's account numbers and passwords to gain access. He then
uploaded the file and published it in a newsletter. 12 1 Riggs was
prosecuted under the NSPA. Although Riggs argued that the
intangible text file was not "goods, wares, or merchandise" under the
NSPA, the court rejected his view. 122 Rather, the court held that using
a modem to steal information was no different from using the victim's
data disk. 123 The Riggs court concluded that reading a tangibility
requirement into the definition of "goods, wares, or merchandise"
would lead to absurd results. 124 In reaching its holding, the court
relied upon the premise that confidential, proprietary business
information possesses something which has clearly been recognized as
25
an item of property.1
Finally, the court distinguished Dowling and its progeny by
stating that the Dowling Court never construed the meaning of
"goods, wares, or merchandise." 126 Rather, the Supreme Court
focused on the rights protected under copyright law which could be
infringed upon, but not stolen or converted. 2 7
118. Id. at 1308 n.14 (citing United States v. Stegorn, 849 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1988)).
119. 925 F.2d at 1307-08.
120. 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Il. 1990).
121. Id. at 416-17.
122. Id. at 421.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 422-23.
126. Id. at 421.
127. Id. at 422-23. This alternate position considers Dowling primarily as a "copyright"
case rather than a "property" case. Such a view may be consistent with other court
holdings concerning the use of telephones to defraud banks and convert money. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kroh, 896 F.2d 1524, 1529, reh'g granted, vacated on other grounds, 904
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982); United
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The final issue left unresolved by Dowling and its progeny is the
issue of preemption. Unlike Dowling, the intellectual property rights
128
afforded creators of trade secrets are primarily based in state law.
Whether the NSPA in some way preempts state trade secret law
because of the federal versus state constructions of "property" has not
been raised to date in the courts.
b. Wire and Mail Fraud
Federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes forbid use of the mails
and interstate electronic communications media to devise or execute a
scheme or artifice to defraud. 129 In the trade secret area, the use of the
mail service to make a payment to a co-conspirator in the
appropriation and interstate transportation of the trade secrets by
defrauding the owner of the trade secrets is a violation of the mail and
or mail fraud
wire fraud statutes.13° A person convicted of wire 1fraud
31
years.
five
to
up
for
prison
to
sent
and
can be fined
Unlike the NSPA, mail and wire fraud statutes may be applied to
"intangible rights."' 13 2 However, it is unclear under existing law
whether the communication of a trade secret, originally acquired
through lawful means, across state lines and subsequent sale of the
secret is a violation of mail and wire fraud statutes.
In a case pending in the Northern District of California, three
individuals have been charged with violations of federal wire and mail
fraud statutes. 133 The indictment alleges that two of the defendants,
David Biehl and John Green, approached Russell Black, an employee
at Varian Associates, Inc., and obtained Varian's confidential and
proprietary parts drawings. 134 Black allegedly used his position within
Varian to obtain confidential and proprietary drawings.135 Black then
States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); Lagerquist v. United States, 820 F.2d
969 (8th Cir. 1987). See also Todd Flaming, comment, The National Stolen Property Act
and Computer Files: A New Form of Property, a New Form of Theft, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 255 (1993).
128. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,1343 (1996).
130. See Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Biehi, CR95-20082 RMW; Arthur Connelly, Theft of Trade Secrets, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
721,728 (1987); but see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
131. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
132. United States v. Henry, 29 F.3d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1994).
133. United States v. Biehl, CR 95-20082 RMW (Indictment filed Jan. 17, 1996).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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allegedly transferred the drawings to Semiconductor Spares, Inc.
(SSI), a company owned by one of the defendants, in exchange for
checks from SSI. 136 Two of the defendants also utilized Martin Calara,
a codefendant, who was employed at Applied Materials. 137 Calara was
allegedly authorized to view and use certain confidential and
proprietary drawings within Applied Materials. 138 The indictment
alleges that the three defendants conspired to divert Applied
Materials' confidential and proprietary parts drawings through
Calara's position at Applied Materials. 139 The government has
asserted that Calara received payments from SSI in excess of
$200,000.140 Finally, the indictment alleges that Biehl approached two
non-parties at Lam Research Corporation and solicited them to
acquire confidential and proprietary parts drawings belonging to Lam
Research similar to the methods used to obtain materials from
Applied Materials and Varian Associates. 141 The basic theory from
the pleadings indicates that parties in positions of confidence with
companies abused the confidence for monetary gain. 142 The abuse of
the confidence is what is alleged to have been the "fraud" in each of
the instances. The case has not yet gone to trial.
c. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
A limited trade secrets law may be applied through the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.143 The CFA prohibits unauthorized
transmission of or access to information or data which intentionally
causes damage to the information or data. 144 The punishment differs
depending on the nature of the harm under the CFA. The penalties
range from a fine or less than a year in jail to a fine and up to ten years
145
in prison.
Although Riggs suggests that the CFA may apply to trade secret
situations, the law remains undeveloped. 146 The most difficult element
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1996) [hereinafter CFA].

144. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(a).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c).
146. 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. I11.1990). No reported case to date has addressed the
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to establish is the "damage" element of the CFA. To date, no court
has determined whether "damage" can simply be caused by
diminishing the value of the information wrongfully taken.
d. Racketeering in Corrupt Organizations

The Racketeering in Corrupt Organizations Act 147 requires at
least two predicate acts within ten years of each other.148 In the trade
secret context, the predicate offense requirement is most easily met
through the wire fraud and mail fraud statutes. However, the National
Stolen Property Act may also be used to establish a predicate
offense.149 RICO may be used in a civil context and offers remedies of
treble damages and attorney's fees.150 If prosecuted criminally, a
conviction under RICO can lead to fines and up to twenty years in
1
prison.

15

An example of the use of RICO in the civil trade secrets context
is International Business Machines v. Hitachi.5 2 In Hitachi, the
plaintiff filed a multi-count suit alleging that the defendants stole
trade secrets in violation of state law and RICO. The case ultimately
settled. Although the terms of the settlement are unknown, RICO
placed the plaintiff in a stronger negotiating position for settlement
because of the possibility of treble damages and additional penalties
153
from RICO.
application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to deal with situations where an
individual merely breaks into a computer system and copies information. However,
application of the CFA is conceivable if damage resulting from the copying is proved.
147. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1996).
148. For examples of criminal trade secrets cases with RICO claims, see S.I. Handling
Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Contintental Data Sys. v. Exxon
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432,438 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
149. Such a position would be very unpredictable because of the inapposite Riggs and
Brown decisions. See supra Part III.A.l.a. Thus, Federal RICO prosecution under the
NSPA may be unlikely.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1996).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1996).
152. No. C82-4976 SW (N.D. Cal. 1982)
153. For example, in the case of General Motors v. Lopez, No. 96-71038 (E.D. Mich.
1996), a high-ranking General Motors executive left General Motors for Volkswagen.
General Motors believed that millions of pages of trade secret information were taken by
the executive. The executive is currently being investigated in the United States and is
being prosecuted in Germany. In a companion civil suit, General Motors has sought civil
RICO damages in addition to trade secret remedies. See General Motors v. Lopez, 948 F.
Supp. 656 (E.D. Mich. 1996). Ultimately, after the District Court denied a motion to
dismiss the RICO claims against Volkswagen, the case settled for over one hundred million
dollars and an agreement by Volkswagen to buy over one billion dollars in parts from
General Motors over seven years. See VW Agrees to Give GM $100 Million to Settle
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e. Economic Espionage Act of 1996
Federal criminal trade secret law, the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, was signed into law approximately one year ago.154 Under the
Act, the taking of "trade secrets" with the intent to injure or with
reason to believe that the taking will injure the owner of proprietary
information and with the intent to convert it to his or her own use or
55
benefit or the use or benefit of another, is a criminal offense.
Additionally, the Act requires that a party appropriate or take away
the proprietary economic information without authorization. 56 Such
acts include such broad categories as stealing, duplicating, sketching,
transporting, or destroying trade secrets.157 The Act also has no
tangibility requirement. 158 Any violation of the Act can lead to
$250,000 in fines or twice the value of the proprietary economic
information, whichever is greater, and imprisonment for ten years for
individual defendants. 159 Organizational defendants may be fined up
to ten million dollars, or twice the value of the taken information,
whichever is greater. 160
The Economic Espionage Act also includes a criminal forfeiture
provision. Section 1834 requires, upon sentencing, forfeiture of any
property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained by the
misappropriator. Additionally, the misappropriator may also be
required to forfeit all property used to commit or facilitate the
61
commission of the violation.'
In addition to the criminal enforcement mechanism, the Attorney
General may also seek appropriate injunctive relief through civil
provisions for any violation of the Act.162 The Attorney General may
use the injunctive power to preserve the status quo or prevent public
disclosure of the trade secret. 163 Furthermore, the Attorney General
Lopez Trade Secret Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997 at A3; GM v. VW, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 9, 1996 at 48.
154. See HR 3723, 104th Cong. (1996) (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996)).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
156. Id.
157. Id. The Act may even include traditionally lawful forms of reverse engineering.
See James Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 192 (1997).

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
Id. § 1832(a).
Id. § 1832(b).
Id. § 1834.
Pooley et al., supra note 157, at 203.
28 U.S.C. § 1836.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 19:853

may use the civil remedies provision in circumstances where the
defendants conduct may not be sufficient to constitute a criminal
violation." Such a result is troubling because parties are able to
protect their commercial entitlements through government
enforcement rather than through normal civil channels.
f. Restitutionary Provisions
An important characteristic of the federal criminal sanctions 165
is
the restitutionary sentencing provision of the United States Code.
Under the provision, a victim company may obtain full restitution for
its losses.166 Although the provision is primarily a sentencing guideline
and does not provide an independent basis for criminal liability, the
restitution provision has important implications. Initially, victim
restitution through criminal prosecution is an available penalty. Civil
litigants can recover through the criminal process without the cost of
civil litigation. The "victim," then suffers reduced transaction costs in
seeking restitution
if the civil litigant can initiate a criminal
167
prosecution.
The Economic Espionage Act presents a particularly troubling
example of restitutionary provisions. As noted above, injunctive relief
is a remedy available exclusively to the government. Under the
provision, private parties cannot protect their trade secrets through
federal law. Instead, they must rely on the Attorney General's
enforcement authority. Further, the forfeiture provisions permit the
government to give the trade secret, and potentially any derivative
information including the trade secret, back to the alleged victim. 168 In
164. Pooley et al., supra note 157, at 203.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1988 & Supp. 1992). This restitutionary provision may be
strengthened if the "Victim's Rights" constitutional amendment is passed. That
amendment specifically includes a right to restitution.

166. 18 U.S.C. §3663.
167. The transaction costs is not reduced to zero, however. For example, the victim
may be required to produce information relevant to the prosecution. In such cases, release
of the information may be subjected to less stringent levels of protection than would be
available in the civil context. See Kenneth Rosenblatt, Criminal Law and the Information
Age: Protecting Trade Secrets from Disclosurein Criminal Cases, 8 COMp. LAW. 15 (1991).
Additionally, once the prosecution is initiated, the victim loses some control of the
litigation and the continuation of the case is primarily contingent on the prosecutor. See
Kenneth Roseblatt, When Should You Really Dial 911?, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 26, 1996,
Intellectual Property Supplement at 14. The restitution provided under a plea agreement
or sentence may accordingly be less than what a private civil litigant would accept or what
is available under civil laws. See id.; Walker, supra note 99, at 687.
168. Section 1834(a)(2) refers to the forfeiture provisions for drug cases. 21 U.S.C.
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the event the information is not returned to the169 "victim," the
government may auction the trade secret information.
The reduction in transaction costs for the "victim" has a number
of effects on competition. First, the incentive for the originator of an
alleged trade secret to initiate litigation through criminal sanctions is
greater than through traditional civil sanctions. Any eligible victim is
able to have a case fully litigated and be compensated with the
"victim" bearing minimal costs of pursuing the action. The "victim"
must consider, however, the loss of control of the litigation to the
prosecution.
The second and more troublesome effect is that the possibility of
a remedy without any cost may reduce the incentive to expend
resources to maintain secrecy, the paramount characteristic of trade
secret law. Indeed, one of the costs to maintain secrecy is the use of
litigation and procedural devices in litigation, such as a preliminary
injunction. If an owner of secret information finds the litigation too
costly, he or she will engage in more aggressive, non-litigation efforts
to maintain the secrecy of the information. With the possibility of
restitution through a less costly procedure (for example, criminal
prosecution), the efforts to maintain secrecy can be reduced without
losing trade secret protection.
Finally, under the Economic Espionage Act, competition is
deterred. The government may decide to freely disperse the trade
secret information through public auction. In such a case, the trade
secret owner loses control of the information and is faced with the
option of purchasing its own secret back, or releasing the information
to a competitor through the governmental auction. The trade secret
owner could also petition the court to obtain the trade secret and
derivative information. Though the trade secret owner obtained a
court order, the trade secret owner could attain a possible windfall
through the derivative information. Indeed, the trade secret owner
could obtain additional trade secrets through no investment or effort
of his or her own. In either case described above, competitors in the
marketplace can easily benefit at below-market cost.

§'853 (1996). Under these provisions, the government must sell the seized property and
property "derived from" a violation. See Pooley et al., supra note 157, at 202-03. However,
21 U.S.C. § 834(n) permits the victim to petition the court for return of the forfeited
property belonging to the victim.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 853(h) (1996). The law requires the government to dispose of seized
assets by sale or any other commercially feasible means. Id.
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State CriminalProtection

State efforts to protect trade secrets are extremely diverse.
Numerous states consider trade secret theft a property crime, albeit
with different methods of protection. 17° A number of states have
forms of trade secret misappropriation as
characterized some
"computer crime." 171 In some cases, the "computer crime" provisions
include explicit protections of trade secrets recorded in electronic or
computer media. The punishments for the crimes range from
misdemeanors to felonies and cover a wide range of potential fines
and imprisonment.

1 72

a. Property-Based Crimes
A number of different methods exist to protect trade secrets as a
property-based crime. Some methods protect trade secrets by defining
them as property. 173 Some states have independent trade secret
misappropriation provisions but characterize the crime within a
property context. 174 Finally, other states require a tangible nexus with
the trade secret misappropriation. Despite the differing approaches,
protecting trade secrets as a form of property right is a common
concept to all the methods.
The most common method does not require taking of an tangible
item. Rather, the state includes trade secrets or "intangibles" as forms
of property.'75 These states generally place trade secret

170. M. JAGER, supra note 11, § 4.01[4]; Anne Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs
and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Punishmentto Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (1990).
See e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 569.095(2)(1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-3C-6 (1996); VA.
§ 815.04(4) (West 1996); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/16D-3(b) (West 1996).
172. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 60A (1996), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-124
(1987), ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1993), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081(2) (West 1996),
171.

CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.3 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.

with ARK. CODE ANN. 5-36-107 (West 1996), COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408(3) (1986),
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.772 (West 1996).
173. For example, some states place trade secret appropriation under "theft" or
"larceny" provisions. See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 30(2) (1996); DEL; CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857(4)
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-23(a) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A § 352(1) (West 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340(I) (1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. 45-6-302(59)(e) and (i)-(k) (1996) (no provision specifically mentions trade
secrets but all the definitions include various elements of trade secrets under existing
standards); N.H. REV. ANN. STAT. § 637:2(l) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(1)

(1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:20-1(a) (West 1996).
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misappropriation in the same category as general larceny, theft or
"crimes against property."' 176 The statutes do not, however, necessarily

define "trade secrets" under their provisions. 177 Generally, these
statutes do not create special categories of crimes or interferences
with trade secret rights. Rather, trade secrets are defined as being
subject to the same property crimes as tangible goods.
A few states have special "property crime" sections addressing
trade secret misappropriation. 178 These states have specifically
designed laws to attempt to define a crime peculiar to the intangible
characteristics of trade secrets. Thus, these states do not require a
taking of a tangible item. Indeed, some states define the crime as an

intent to deprive an owner of control of commercially valuable
information. 179 By focusing on control and value, the laws attempt to
draw conceptual fences around the trade secrets rather than placing

trade secrets squarely within traditional property crimes. Implicit in
the sections, however, is the assumption that trade secrets law is a
property-based paradigm.
A final method of protection is to require a nexus between the
trade secret and a tangible medium. States that use this method
typically characterize trade secret misappropriation as theft or
larceny.'8 0 Some states still define trade secrets as a form of property
under this approach.' 8 ' However, a number of states also have
specific, special trade secret laws requiring a nexus.18 2 Despite the
different treatment of trade secrets, all these states require a copy or a

176. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 60A; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II § 857.
Washington and Connecticut are adopting such an approach but not specifically defining trade
secrets as property. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.56.010(e) (West 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West 1987).
177. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 35-41-1-23(a)(9) (Burnes 1987 & Supp. 1994); N.H.
STAT. § 637:2(l).
178. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-4-408 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 812.081 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 168-13 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.771 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 60A; TEX.
PENAL § 31.05.
179. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107 (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408.
180. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1732
(1991).
181. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1) (West. 1981 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
155.00 (McKinney 1996) (includes elements of trade secret information under definition of
property but having separate definition for secret scientific material).
182. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1996); Wis. STAT. § 943.205 (1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1732
(1991).
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tangible item containing the trade secret to be taken for a finding of
183
criminal liability.
Differing standards of protection through criminal law are a
result of the uncertainty with fully recognizing trade secret law as
property. For instance, the tangibility requirement of some states is
analogous with federal appellate courts' current difficulty under the
National Stolen Property Act.184 Furthermore, even in those states
that define trade secrets as a form of property, some states have been
compelled to amend their theft and larceny statutes to address the
unique nature of trade secrets. The majority of the differing patterns
of protection demonstrate a desire to protect trade secrets, but a
discomfort in applying a proper conceptual framework to trade secret
protection.
b. Computer Crime
A number of states have enacted statutes concerning "computer
crime" which may involve trade secrets. 185 The vast majority of these
states do not require a finding of secrecy or of value of any item.
Rather, the statutes primarily seek to discourage unwarranted or
unauthorized entry to a computer system, the taking of anything from
the computer system, regardless of value, and/or damage to the
computer system. The value of an item taken or destroyed will often
only be used to define the gravity of the offense. 186 Finally, some
states characterize the crime under the heading of "property

183.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930(b) (requiring an article representing a trade

secret); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00(6), 155.05(2), 165.07 (limited to secret scientific
information); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-14-138(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205(1); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1732(A); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52.
184. See supraPart III.A.l.a.
185. ALASKA STAT. § 13A-8-100 (Michie 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502; COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-5.5-101; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-252 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §
932 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.02 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708890 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-2201 (1996); 720 ILL. STAT. § 5/16D-1 (West 1993); IOWA
CODE § 716A.1 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3755 (1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 431 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270B.18 (West 1981 & Supp.
1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-1 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1341 (1988 & Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:16 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-41 (Michie 1994);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1952 (West 1991);

OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 161-90 (Law co-op 1993); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-701 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 818.2-152.1 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 613C-1 (1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-501 (Michie 1996).
186. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-45-3, 30-45-5 (Michie 1994).
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crimes." 18 7 In most cases, the computer crime statutes exist in addition
to other criminal trade secret laws.
Under the computer crime statutes, trade secret misappropriation
can be prosecuted without regard to the nature of the secret or its

value. Rather, the unauthorized entry and, normally, copying of data
is itself a crime. The question then simply becomes whether a criminal
defendant had authorization to enter a particular computer database
or program. Unlike trade secret prosecution under other theories, no
finding of what was maintained in secrecy or what had commercial
value is necessary. The limitation in these cases, however, is that a
be involved for the
computer program, database, or system must
188
computer crime statutes to apply to the crime.

IV
Economic Limitations of Criminal Trade Secret Protection
A.

Employment Burdens

Trade secret protection inherently burdens employment
relationships. 189 Under the applicable trade secret laws, employees
who are under an obligation not to disclose may be subject to
prosecution (for example, where a former employer believes that an
employee is currently using commercially valuable information
learned in the course of his/her former employment). 190 If a new
employer hires the employee, it must always be conscious of possible
187. See, e.g., 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16D-1 (West 1993)(defining property as
confidential, copyrighted or proprietary information, as well as other things).
188. The federal government is currently considering a federal statute to protect
databases. See HR 3531, 104th Cong. (1996). Section 8 of the proposed statute criminalizes
willful, unauthorized extraction, use or reuse of all or a substantial part of a database in a
manner that conflicts with the owner's normal exploitation of a database or interferes with
the actual or potential market for the database. The criminal sanction also requires that the
appropriating party engage in the taking of database information for direct or indirect
commercial advantage or commercial gain or causes the loss of over $10,000 a year in a
single year. An appropriator may be fined up to $250,000 and/or five years in prison for a
first violation. Subsequent violations aggravate the sentencing. See id. § 4, 8.
189. See Edmund Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protectionand the Mobility of
Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664-65 (1996);
Kitch, supra note 81 at 703.
190. Notice that the nature of the injury changes when an employee is involved. The
employee has not illegally taken something. Rather, the employee learned commercially
sensitive information in the course of employment. The former employer, knowing that it
cannot take the information back, can only limit the former employee's ability to use the
information.
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trade secret issues.
Consider the well-publicized case of Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v.
Avant! Corp.191 In the case, a number of former Cadence employees
left to form Avant!. As the company developed, Avant! hired a
number of high-ranking Cadence engineers and executives. Cadence

became concerned that some engineers and executives were using
trade secrets acquired from Cadence in the course of their former
employment. Cadence began investigating a number of "Cadence
defectors" and believed that trade secrets may have been taken.
Cadence reported its concerns to the Santa Clara County District
Attorney. The district attorney began an investigation and initially
decided to prosecute at least one of the defectors.' 9 2 Cadence

ultimately decided to file a civil suit when it found that typographical
errors in their programs were also allegedly in Avant!'s programs and
193
after the criminal prosecution was initiated.
Placing some burdens on the employment relationship is
necessary to protect trade secrecy. 194 However, employees also
195
generally are entitled to work in the place that values them most.

The result is that an employee may want to work in a growing business
and gain access to proprietary information but, at the same time, the
employee may wish to have the flexibility to change jobs if he/she so
chooses. 196 An employee who changes jobs but remains in the same

profession may not be able to avoid drawing upon the skills,
experience, and knowledge developed at the previous job. 197 Therein
191. 1997 WL 583702 (9th Cir. 1997).
192. A number of other individuals are also under investigation as of the writing of this
paper. The initial "defector" indicted was not actually hired by Avant!. Rather, the
individual opened a.consulting firm and allegedly "funneled" trade secrets to Avant!
through his consultancy arrangement. Since the filing of the civil case, six additional
individuals have been indicted for trade secret theft.
193. Cadence has agreed to provide its experts in the civil case as expert witnesses for
the prosecution in the criminal case.
194. Kitch, supra note 189, at 669. For cases relating to employment contracts and
trade secrets, see Emery v. Merrimack Valley Wood Prods., Inc., 701 F.2d 985 (1st Cir.
1983); Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596 (Ariz. App. 1986); DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990); Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 180
Cal. Rptr. 451 (Cal. App. 1982); AMP v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987);
Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986).
195. See, e.g., Bruce Alan Kugler, Note, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U.
L. REV. 725, 728 (1988); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 852 (1st Cir. 1985).
196. See Thornton Robinson, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About
Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 348 (1983).
197. See Pepsico v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp. v.
Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Merck & Co. v.
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lies the tension between employer and employee interests.
The appropriate balance in such employer-employee
relationships should enable both the employer and employee to
pursue competitive goals.' 98 Under such a scheme, the parties are in a
position to bargain and define what each party believes is protectible
and should not be disclosed to the new employer. 199 However, the
threat of criminal sanctions can dramatically alter the bargaining
positions of the parties.
Consider the following example. Jetson is currently an engineer at
Spacely Sprockets. Cogswell Cogs has offered Jetson a job at a higher
salary. Jetson gives Spacely Sprockets notice. Spacely Sprockets
informs Jetson that Cogswell Cogs' products are virtually identical to
Spacely Sprockets' products. Accordingly, Jetson would invariably
disclose Spacely Sprockets' trade secrets should he move to Cogswell
Cogs. Spacely Sprockets also informs Jetson that if he does disclose
trade secrets, Spacely Sprockets will involve the district attorney and
will make sure Jetson is criminally prosecuted to the fullest extent of
the law.
In such a situation, Jetson may very well decide to stay at Spacely
Sprockets despite the fact that another employer values him more.
Such a result is economically inefficient because Jetson is not
permitted to work at the place that values him most. The
consequences of criminal sanctions are so severe that Jetson may not
move to a new employer because the risk of prosecution is too high.2°°
Jetson is unduly restrained from free employment as a result of these
threatened sanctions. Further, unlike the taking of physical property,
Jetson can not give back that information he learned in the course of
his employment. Jetson's mere knowledge prevents his mobility in the
workplace. Criminal sanctions for trade secret appropriation, then,
often act as a form of over-deterrence which creates economic
inefficiency and impedes an actor from using unprotectable
information to the benefit of the individual or company who values it
most.20 1 Such an effect reduces competition in the marketplace.

Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
198. Miles Feldman, Comment, Toward a ClearerStandardof ProtectableInformation:
Trade Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 156 (1994).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 172.
201. Id. at 172,179; AMP, 823 F.2d at 1205.
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B. Economic Benefits to Alleged Victim
Criminalizing trade secrets also opens the possibility for abuse by
an alleged victim. If an alleged victim can persuade the district
attorney to prosecute, the victim can litigate many of the claims
through the prosecutor's office.2 °2 If a civil action is initiated, the
criminal action also has some significant implications which favor the
civil plaintiff.
The trade secret claim can be litigated through the prosecutor's
office. The case of People v. Eubanks2 3 is a good example. In the case,
Borland asserted that a high-ranking executive had stolen trade
secrets when he accepted a job with Symantec. The district attorney,
unable to bear the extremely high costs of analysis of the technical
material underlying the trade secret, sought reimbursement for
investigative expenses from Borland. Borland agreed to pay the
expenses, and, ultimately, the defendant was indicted. A related state
court civil action also existed but was stayed.2 °4 Such a case raises a
number of questions, including the impartiality of the district
attorney's office and the efforts by Borland to use the criminal
20 5
prosecution to benefit the civil litigation.
20 6
A second example is Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp.
In the case, Cadence approached the district attorney and identified
its trade secrets and a pattern of activity which it believed to be trade
secret theft. The district attorney, relying on Cadence's
representations, began investigation and prosecution of at least one of
the civil defendants prior to the initiation of the civil lawsuit. Indeed,
the pleadings indicated that the prosecutors were in constant contact
with Cadence when search warrants were executed to search one of
the criminal defendant's homes. Cadence also provided its experts
20 7
from the civil case for use in the criminal case.
202. Criminal litigation, however, has limitations that civil litgation does not. See
Walker, supra note 99, at 687.
203. 14 Cal. 4th 580 (Cal. 1996).
204. The civil action has since settled.
205. The California Supreme Court held that the propriety of the interaction between
private individuals and the prosecution is a factual decision better left to the trial court.
Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 594. The California Supreme Court also found that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney's office for its financial
cooperation with the "victim." Id.
206. 1997 WL 583702 (9th Cir. 1997); See also supra notes 191-193 and accompanying
text.
207.

The defendants have filed a motion to disqualify the experts, similar to the claim

made in the Eubanks case. Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 500.
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These cases exemplify a victim company's ability to initiate a
prosecution for the wrongful taking or use of information under
existing law. However, the unique nature of technical crimes such as
those in Eubanks and Cadence create an unusual necessity for
extraordinary cooperation between a potential civil plaintiff and
criminal prosecutor. Due to the complexity of the technological issues
in intellectual property crimes, the district attorney must rely on the
aggrieved party to make important determinations. 20 8 Unlike
traditional crimes, the district attorney is extremely reliant on what
the victim believes is its trade secret, as well as what was
appropriated.2 9 Such a result is troublesome because the aggrieved
party is given the power to evaluate issues central to both civil and
criminal prosecution based on the lack of technical sophistication of
the district attorney. The district attorney must rely on the alleged
victim for the definition of the case; that is, the district attorney must
rely on the victim's definition of what is a "trade secret." The net
effect is that the aggrieved party becomes both the civil, litigant and
the private prosecutor.
The reasonable alternative would be to stay the civil action
pending resolution of the criminal action. 210 However, in order to
208. Cadence, 1997 WL 583702 (Order granting stay of discovery as to defendant
Igusa, denying stay of proceedings as to defendant Avant!, and granting plaintiff's motion
for modification of protective order, dated March 14, 1996). Although a possible
analogous situation could be made to cases involving fraud, the analogy is less than
compelling. Unlike fraud cases, the aggrieved party in trade secret cases is typically
attempting prosecution of a competitor. Therefore, the "victim" has a vested interest in
prosecution for reasons other than an alleged injury. Another potential problem in trade
secret-type cases may be the use of experts. For example, the high level of cooperation
may allow the civil litigant to "screen" experts for the prosecution. The civil litigant could
offer to provide the expert for the prosecution and not disclose unfavorable experts. Such a
situation raises potentially complex issues of duties to disclose exculpatory evidence under
the Due Process Clause. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962).
209. Indeed, one of the primary treatises on High Technology Crime specifically
coaches companies how to prepare a criminal case before presenting it to a prosecutor. See
KENNETH ROSENBLATr, HIGH TECH CRIME (1995).

210. The Constitution does not require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome
of criminal proceedings. Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir.
1995). Rather, a court, in its discretion, may decide to stay civil proceedings. Id. Generally,
the decision maker should consider:
(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation or
any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2)
the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on
defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and
the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to
the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 19:853

prevent irreparable harm to the alleged victim, proceedings generally
will not be stayed until the civil action has proceeded to a preliminary
is named in the civil action,
injunction hearing.211 If a corporation 212
stays of proceedings are even less likely.
The preliminary injunction discovery can be prejudicial for a
number of reasons. First, a significant risk exists that the civil
213
discovery will be used as a pretext for criminal discovery.
Furthermore, despite efforts made by courts to avoid such actions,
defendants are still faced with the very real problem of asserting their
Fifth Amendment rights in the criminal prosecution while defending
themselves in the civil litigation. Under existing law, assertions of
Fifth Amendment privileges by individuals can be214 construed
negatively against defendants in a "companion" civil case.
The victim can use the criminal case to interfere with the
operations of a company. For companies planning to release a new
product, an alleged victim could obtain a preliminary injunction to
prevent the new product's entry. The Fifth Amendment assertions can
be used to create negative inferences to support a finding of likelihood
of success on the merits. Another possible technique could be to
initiate the trade secret actions to devalue a company prior to its
initial public offering. Indeed, Avant! has asserted that Cadence
abused the process through both criminal and civil litigation to
attempt to preclude the release of a new product by Avant!. Avant!
criminal litigation.
Id. at 324-25 (citing Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.
1989)).
211. Indeed, under the Economic Espionage Act, the government may proceed to
enjoin activity at the expense of taxpayers rather than the alleged victim.
212. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 92 F.R.D. 358, 360 (D. Md. 1981).
213. The courts have attempted, at great lengths, to prevent such abuses through stays
of proceedings or discovery. The leading case on the subject is Golden Quality Ice Cream
Co. v. Deerfield Specialty, 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 F.2d 201, 204 (3d Cir. 1967); AfroLecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Currie
Enters., 142 F.R.D. 8 (D. Mass. 1991); United States v. All Funds on Deposit, 767 F. Supp.
36 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Bruner Corp. v. Balogh, 819 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
214. See Keating, 45 F.3d at 326; RAD Servs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271,
278-79 (3d Cir. 1986); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Fla. 1990); However,
the inference is permissive. State Farm Life Ins. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir.
1990). See also In re Stelweck, 86 B.R. 833, 850-51 (E.D. Pa. 1988); National Acceptance
Co. of America v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1983); Lionti v. Lloyd's Ins. Co.,
709 F.2d 237, 243 n.9 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983); Martin Kaminsky,
Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self Incriminationin Private Civil Litigation:
A CriticalAnalysis,12 NEw ENG. L.REV. 121,143 (1972).
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alleges that its product would effectively compete with Cadence
products.215 Such possibilities can have a chilling effect on competition
with limited corresponding social benefit.
Accordingly, criminalizing the trade secret law can be used for
anticompetitive purposes to keep competitors out of the market and
for tactical advantage in civil litigation. Since the goal of trade secret
law is to encourage competition, those laws which can be used in an
anticompetitive fashion should be rejected. Criminal trade secret law
is one of those laws.

V
The Property/Liability Model Applied to the
Criminalized Trade Secrets
The factor distinguishing criminal law from the other bodies of
law "is its operation as a system of moral education and
socialization."' 216 Criminal punishment promotes social norms of
behavior by "shaping the preferences of criminals and the population
' By criminalizing activities, society increases the costs of
at large."217
criminal activity, thus making criminal behavior more undesirable to

215. It should be noted, however, that Cadence may have a cause of action on both
criminal and civil fronts under existing law. Cadence actions are justified, even if they
actually exhibit predatory behavior, because the actions are permitted under the existing
law. Indeed, Cadence was ultimately successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction to
preclude sales of Avant!'s product. See Cadence v. Avant! 1997 WL 583702 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the district court appeared to be strongly influenced by
the fact that an injunction would be devastating to Avant!'s business. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit held that such considerations are reversible error when balancing hardships
for a preliminary injunction. See also Triad Sys. Co. v. Southeastern Express, 64 F.3d 1330,
1338 (9th Cir. 1995); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 893 F.2d 600, 612
(1st Cir. 1988). In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that waivability of money damages
cannot rebut the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases. Such rigid views
create devastating effects when a parallel criminal prosecution exists. (The analysis is also
illogical because copyright protection, like other intellectual property laws, are economic
in character. Discussion of this issue is better left to another article). Since the Fifth
Amendment assertion places a civil corporate defendant at a severe disadvantage with
respect to discovery of evidence relevant to defense, the availability of money damages
and hardship to the corporation are some of the only defenses remaining. Under the
majority of jurisdictions, the trial courts are not permitted to consider such effects. A savvy
first comer to the market can use such a standard to its tactical, anticompetitive advantage.
See also supra notes 167-169.
216. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinctionin American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
217. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of Law as a Preference Shaping
Policy, 1996 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1990).
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any particular actor. 21' By imposing such costs, society can also
express its "condemnation 219of a criminal act and discourage
preferences for such activity.,
Trade secrets laws, like other new forms of law, have been
criminalized because of public concern about a relatively newly
perceived social problem. 22 ° The new criminal legislation limits
individual freedom without evaluating the social and economic
impacts. 221 Despite such reflexive criminalization, the additional social
costs need to be considered
to determine whether the "wrong" is
222
appropriately criminalized.
Unlike legal paradigms which are primarily restitutionary,
traditional criminal law threatens a defendant with much more severe
consequences for socially undesirable conduct.223 In the context of the
property/liability model, traditional criminal law prevented individuals
from undermining property and inalienability rules. 224 For instance, if
society permitted an individual to take a television and merely pay the
cost of the television and incidental damages, the property rule would
be undermined by changing it into a liability rule.225 Such a result is
inefficient and contrary to traditional property rules because the
original owner of the television may value the television differently
from how society values the information. 226 Society imposes severe
criminal penalties with expected values in excess of damages to
prevent individuals from converting property which may have
differing individual and social valuations.227
The severe criminal sanction imposes significant costs. First, an
individual may be deprived of freedom, money, and other rights
218. Id. at 6; Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of ControllingIndividuals: An Economic
Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation,and Deterrence, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 311

(1981); see also Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation,77 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS AND PROC. 107, 110 (1987); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
219. Dau-Schmidt, supranote 217, at 37.
220. John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models - And What Can Be DoneAbout It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881 (1992).
221. Id.; see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80

(1968).
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
detailed
227.

Coffee, supra note 220, at 1881.
Id. at 1876.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1125-26.
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 217, at 33.
See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1093-1105 (providing a
analysis of economic efficiency and distributional goals in criminal law).
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 217, at 33.
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normally guaranteed to citizens. These deprivations may include
preventing the individual from earning a wage while imprisoned.
Second, restitution to victims may be required under the sanction. In
addition, traditional criminal penalties impose a "stigma" that does
not attach to other sanctions.22 8 The effect of the stigma can affect
future employment and other personal relationships. Thus, the
traditional criminal sanction can have severe economic consequences.
Modern liability rules, on the other hand, can provide a number
of less severe deterrent sanctions to prevent socially undesirable
conduct. For instance, criminal penalties are unnecessary when the
tortfeasor has the ability to pay tort damages, including punitive
damages. 229 Such rules are applicable where the nature of the injury is
defined by the market value of the injury and where the social view of
the gravity of the offense is less severe. 230 Punitive damages in
liability-based regimes, as well as traditional criminal sanctions, can
satisfy the dual purposes of criminal law to shape preferences and
extract a price for wrongful or "blameworthy" actions, when the
individual and social values are similar.
Reasonable punitive sanctions are an attractive option in the
context of liability-based regimes.231 Specifically, punitive sanctions
are useful in those situations in which the expected imposition of
liability rules would encourage a defendant to wrongly take plaintiff's
intangibles rather than negotiate for them.232 The punitive damages
provide a mechanism to strip a defendants of their gain by abusing a

228. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1205 (1985).
229.

RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 222 (4th ed. 1992).

Posner continues to argue that where fines are an efficient method of punishment and
deterrent from socially undesirable conduct, criminal sanctions such as imprisonment are
inefficient and undesirable. Id. at 227-228.
230. Id. at 227; see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).
231. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 338 (1988); W. LANDES & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 186-89 (1987); see also Jason S.
Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L.

REV. 1385 (1987); but see George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and EnterpriseLiability, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 123,132 (1982); Dorsey P. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 77 (1982); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived its Origins,37 V. AND L. REV. 1117,1154-66

(1984).
232. David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1990).
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liability rule. 233 The cost imposed will often outweigh the benefit of
taking the information rather than negotiating for it. 234 Accordingly,
the punitive damage paradigm shapes a preference to negotiate rather
than to take. 235 For these reasons, trade secret regimes generally
236
provide punitive remedies for intentional actions.
To a certain extent, punitive damages are imposed to serve
criminal law purposes but in a civil context. 237 The primary purposes
of punitive damages are deterrence and retribution. 238 Deterrence
theory suggests that an actor will weigh a calculation of the likelihood
of being "caught," the cost of being "caught," and whatever punitive
sanction may be imposed. 239 Under liability-based theories, punitive
remedies may deter the same behavior as conventional criminal
remedies if the socially reprehensible conduct is primarily
economic,
240
and the punitive damage is substantially high enough.
At the same time, civil remedies are a means to impose liability
for antisocial behavior without "invoking the full procedural and
moral artillery of a criminal case." 241 Furthermore, without the
criminal sanctions afforded under traditional criminal regimes, the
"stigma" of social condemnation is less likely to attach to the socially
undesirable conduct. 242 Punitive sanctions, then, may not be effective

233. Id. at 18.
234. Id. at 19; see also W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 231, at 160-163 (applying a
court-error deterrence model justifying punitive sanctions).
235. Haddock et al., supra note 232, at 25.
236. Id. at 27; Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 742-44 (1969).
237. Theodore Olson & Theodore Boutrous, Jr., The Supreme Court's Developing
Punitive Damages Jurisprudence,1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 17, 18 (1994).
238. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,467 (1993) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
239. POSNER, supra note 229, at 233-34.
240. Id.; Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1355 (1991). The availability of punitive damages may,
however, create incentives to sue because of the possibility of a windfall in addition to
restitutionary damages. See generally Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort
Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61
(1992); James Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the
Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. L. REV. 1130 (1992); Note, An Economic Analysis of
Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992).
241. Cheh, supra note 240, at 1346.
242. Id. at 1352; Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 401, 404 (1958). See also Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws through Civil
Proceedings:Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 USC § 1964, 53
TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1061-62 (1975).
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in that they do not carry the full weight of criminal punishment. 243 .
Conversely, civil punitive remedies have a few advantages. For
instance, the use of civil remedies may "increase the incidence of
punishment by increasing the likelihood that offenders will be
pursued."' 244 Generally, civil remedies are simpler, more efficient, and
less expensive than criminal prosecution. 245 Civil remedies further
"permit the government to enlist and even conscript victims to
246
prosecute" individuals who engage in socially undesirable behavior.
Because of the increased attractiveness of punitive fines to
"private prosecutors,"' 247 who are also normally the victims in a case,
the Constitution imposes limitations on excessive fines. Specifically,
the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines clause reads "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted., 248 Generally, the appropriate standard
for punitive damages under the excessive fines clause is
"reasonableness." 249 However, the state of the law on the excessive
250
fines clause is far from defined.
A final benefit of the punitive damage scheme is that it does not
create over-deterrence. For instance, perhaps a company values a
trade secret more than the punitive and restitutionary damages
combined. If the victim is compensated (and perhaps even
overcompensated through a punitive scheme) for the value of the
product, an economic efficiency may be gained by allowing the taker
to utilize the information because he or she values the information
more than the owner. Without the traditional criminal sanction, the
cost of using the information is lower, and a taker can assess whether
he or she values the information sufficiently to justify the punitive and
243. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989). See also Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1808 (1992).
244. Cheh, supra note 240, at 1345.
245. Id.

246. Id. at 1347.
247. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages:A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
839, 850 (1993); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1257,1287-88 (1976).

248. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
249. United States v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
250. Compare BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), with
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources

Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), and
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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restitutionary cost. In the alternative, the "victim" is able to use civil
injunctions to preclude use if the taker is unwilling to pay a sufficient
fine.
VI
Conclusion
Trade secret protection is an important facet of our intellectual
property system. Trade secret protection is most effective where
entitlements to particular innovations are defined and protected by
the government to strike a balance between private incentive and the
maximization of social welfare. Such a regime is inherently tenuous
and requires careful balancing of competing interests to minimize
social cost. Blanket criminalization of trade secrets under propertybased theories leads to anticompetitive effects. Therefore, trade
secrets are better protected through civil paradigms with punitive
sanctions for the intentional taker of trade secrets. Further, traditional
criminal sanctions are an inappropriate intrusion into the trade secret
regime and upset the balance between public access and private
incentive. To deter socially undesirable conduct of unauthorized trade
secret use, the trade secret system provides an incentive structure to
encourage individual actors to negotiate for information rather than
take the information without authorization. Punitive damages can
effectively create such an incentive structure.

